

# **Russia vs. Telegram**

## technical notes on the battle

Leonid Evdokimov  
35c3, Leipzig, 29 Dec 2018  
[darkk.net.ru/35c3](https://darkk.net.ru/35c3)

\$ whoami


Internet measurement fanatic

NOT a Telegram team member

One of the millions of Telegram users




# Brief history



## Pre-blocklist era

2007 May 23: court order for 4 (four) ISP to block access to “extremist” websites

2007 Jul 14: the 1st issue of the “Federal List of Extremist Materials” by Ministry of Justice




## Librarian's resistance

2011 Feb: [www.zhurnal.lib.ru](http://www.zhurnal.lib.ru) is banned

Maksim Moshkow "transfers" domain to the Ministry of Justice (via DNS "A" RR)

Some ISPs block [minjust.ru](http://minjust.ru) ˘\\_ (ツ) \\_ /˘




## Blocklist awakens

2012 Jul 10: [Wikipedia](#) strikes, [Yandex](#) & VK [protest](#)

2012 Jul 11: the internet restriction bill accepted by Duma (Parliament)

[2012 Jul 28](#): the bill signed




## What's the blacklist like today?

XML file, signed by CN=Roskomnadzor with GOST, fetches by ISPs via SOAP, updated at least hourly.

ISPs **control** filtering equipment.

Roskomnadzor **monitors** it.



## Blocklist 2012 awards

8 Nov: [Absurdopedia](#) (Uncyclopedia)

11 Nov: [Lurkmore](#) memepedia, [lib.rus.ec](#)

17 Nov: [Github repo](#) with blocklist leak

18 Nov: Google's [https://...gstatic.com](#)






## Blacklisted resources in pre-Telegram era

Web Archive, GitHub, Google, LinkedIn,  
Pornhub, Reddit, VK, Wikipedia...

Comodo CA CRL & OCSP responders

127.0.0.1 (sic!)



## “Revisor” – Roskomnadzor’s monitoring system

The law does not matter. The fine does.

2016 Jan: [OpenWRT-based](#) TP-Link

MR3020, that was talking with C&C via  
https API without ca-certificates  
and via ssh without known\_hosts



## Внимание!

Эта страница НЕ ИМЕЕТ ОТНОШЕНИЯ к провайдеру, через которого осуществляется проверка факта открытия веб-сайтов Ревизором.

Подробную информацию читайте по ссылке: <https://habrahabr.ru/post/282087/>



## **“Revisor” – complying with blackbox**

No codified monitoring rules, just [FAQ](#)

Some ISPs reverse-engineer it


Some ISPs comply at best-effort

Some ISPs place it into a “sandbox”






Logo of  
Revisor-devoted  
Telegram chat  
[@i love auditor](#)



## “Revisor” & DNS

ISPs are forced to comply with the black-box monitoring system

Stale IPs in dump.xml, “Revisor” using DNS... ⇒ ISPs feed A & AAAA from DNS *directly* to filters




# “Revisor”-provoked so called “DNS-attacks”

2017 May 15: block IP from DNS? [Bo-om!](#)

Adding /32 from DNS to routing table?


2017 Jun 7: [drop IX peers!](#)

2018 Mar 14: [routers go on strike!](#)





# **Telegram: Policeman Enters The Game**





# Telegram? Why?

2017 Apr 7: St.Petersburg bombing

2017 Jun 26, FSB: “terrorists used TG”

RKN promises to block, counts days.

2017 Jun 28: Telegram added to the  
“Information Distributors Registry”



# Telegram non-compliance

2017 Dec: Roskomsvoboda starts legal campaign [Telegram vs. FSB](#)

2018 Mar 20: court orders Telegram to pass encryption keys to FSB

2018 Apr 16: RKN [attempts](#) to block




# Civil cyber-war: leak of BGP-Blackholing letter

Mar 23: Mikhael Klimarev publishes [leak](#)

RKN plans ban of 15M IPs: 36 subnets of Amazon, SoftLayer, ... to block Zello.

Keywords: Null0, BGP, redistribute.





*RKN-tan tries  
to block 14 million  
IP addresses of  
Amazon hosting  
half of Internet*

– [@aquam1ne](#)



## Civil cyber-war: April, 16th, TZ=MSK

11:39 RKN bans TG's ~/19, no effect

17:58 bans Amazon's ~/13, TG works

18:33 adds missing TG's /24 ~\\_(\ツ)\\_/\_

20:21 Google's /12, Amazon's /15...

1.8 M IPs banned, Telegram is ~fine




# Civil cyber-war: that escalated quickly

Apr 16: ~ 1.8 M banned IPs

Apr 17: ~ 16 M

Apr 22: ~ 19 M, *local* peak



# Civil cyber-war: IP space sanity checks? Ha!


Overlapping subnets in blacklist:

52.0/11       $\cap$  52.28/15

34.192/10     $\cap$  34.240/13

52.192/11      $\cap$  52.208/13

...




**Civil cyber-war: URL sanity checks? Ha!**

Malformed URL in blacklist:

```
<![CDATA[http: / / 46.101.189.65]]>
```

^ whitespace

Guess, what filter do?





# Civil cyber-war: major services by mistake? Ha!


RKN: significant ones are not affected

Affected: ~34 k .ru, .рф, .su services

Affected: vk.com (87.240.129.133)

Affected: Yandex.Metrica  
(213.180.193.119)

Affected: Yandex ads (77.88.21.90)



## Civil cyber-war: fakenews? Sure!


RKN: “Google Play, Google Drive and google.ru IPs were not banned”

Data: dozens IPs of load balancers discovered via EDNS Client Subnet are actually blocklisted



























	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	IPv4
www.google.com, №0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	418
google.com, №1	0	100	96	61	86	76	82	89	76	95	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	509
play.google.com, №2	0	94	100	60	84	75	81	87	75	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	520
www.youtube.com, №3	0	47	48	100	45	41	48	45	49	47	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	659
docs.google.com, №4	0	85	85	57	100	82	73	79	73	85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	514
drive.google.com, №5	0	82	83	58	90	100	74	80	76	82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	468
connectivitycheck.android.com, №6	0	94	95	71	85	78	100	90	79	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	444
clients3.google.com, №7	0	95	96	62	86	79	84	100	80	96	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	474
s.ytimg.com, №8	0	84	85	70	82	78	77	83	100	85	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	458
www.google-analytics.com, №9	0	95	96	61	86	75	82	89	76	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	510
stats.g.doubleclick.net, №10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	308
googleads.g.doubleclick.net, №11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	375
www.googletagmanager.com, №12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	250
fonts.googleapis.com, №13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	0	0	0	0	0	235
fonts.gstatic.com, №14	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	86	92	0	0	275
www.google.ru, №15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	91	100	92	0	0	261
google.ru, №16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	88	84	100	0	0	287
mail.google.com, №17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100	91	362
gmail.com, №18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	94	100	351


G.DNS




# Civil cyber-war: ISP non-compliance

А примерно так ISP (не) блокируют облака:


	Yandex	Blackberry	Telegram	Amazon	Google	Digital Ocean
Rostelecom						
Vimpelcom						
MTS						
ER-Telecom						



MSM/Probe 12219920#34930 (1 cert) @ AS12389 (ROSTELECOM-AS - PJSC Rostelecom); Ban / unban: 2018-04-23 08:46:44 / 2018-05-08 10:52:38



Delayed compliance example, RIPE Atlas data



# Civil cyber-war: lawful interception?

Sniffers used to hunt proxies?



28 Apr: public “[tip](#)”, 30 Apr: private tip

Unsecured SORMs, pumping 20 Gbit/s,  
leaking rpm repo, [clickstream](#) and [PII](#)?!




# SORM: this incident was reported

Sum of 26 "sniffers" BW, May the 4th (and the 5th)






# Protest meetings because of app ban!







# Civil cyber-war: Morse prank




DIGITALRESISTANCE




# Civil cyber-war: Morse prank




Countdown (cheap drama)



# Civil cyber-war: Morse prank



“Truly, Popov!” – Radio Day greeting



# Civil cyber-war: prank-effects

Nice amplitude fade-out (thanks, RKN!)

“&.” TLD flash-blocking

15 M → 11 M banned IPs

Expired domains blocklist cleanup



## Civil cyber-war: partial rollback

28 Apr: 19 M → 15 M (protest)


8 May: 15 M → 11 M (prank?)

8 Jun: 11 M → 3.7 M (?)

7 Jul: Open Letter on collateral damage  
had no effect, still ~3.7 M



**PCAP or it didn't happen**




## Selective protocol throttling

TG speaks Socks5, MTProto, MTproto-dd

~7500 kbps: Socks5, HTTP xor RC4

~22 kbps: MTProto, obfs4, `nc urandom`

Camouflage matters!




## Proxy-hunting: MTProto

pkt.len-based hunting was noticed

Rostelecom was part of the experiment

Any IP:Port may be killed by “knocking”


Reuters: “alike experiment happened”







## Proxy-hunting: Socks5 in Moscow subway

1. One uses Socks5 in subway
2. Nmap scans IP:Port
3. Socks5-scanner tries connect(TG)
4. IP unreachable via some ISPs
5. IP officially blocklisted



### Blocking of 173.255.215.241:24914, experiment s5tg-05




## Secret blacklist private to some ISPs?

> 4. *IP unreachable via **some** ISPs*


Some other blacklists exist... regional?...

...*at least* List of Extremist Materials

Block-race is still observed



**And then things got worse**



# Roskomnadzor: The Phantom Menace

RKN deploys “anti-threat” equipment


That also acts as filter

RKN *directly* controls IP routing & DNS

Registry of “good” Internet Exchanges



**so it goes**



# Thanks to!

[Philipp Kulin](#), [ValdikSS](#),  
[Mikhael Klimarev](#),  
[Dmitry Nazarov](#),  
[Alex Rudenko](#),  
[Dmitry Belyavskiy](#),  
[Wartan Hachaturow](#),  
[Dmitry Moskin](#),  
[Dmitry Morozovsky](#),

Simone Basso, Maria  
Xynou, Moritz Bartl,  
[zapret-info](#), [SPb CTF](#),  
[Roskomsvoboda](#), Digital  
Resistance Measurement  
Squadron, [“the one who is  
to blame”](#), [“Revisor” fans](#),  
[NAG](#), RIPE Atlas, ...



# Thanks RKN & Durov for fun!

## Questions?

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[usher2.club](#)  
[darkk.net.ru/35c3](#)

